What Nvidia’s security team knew about the Megaspeed inquiry

David Reber, Nvidia’s chief security officer and head of product security for four years, said in late August that he was leaving for health reasons. He disclosed that he had been diagnosed with young-onset Parkinson’s more than two years earlier and said family and health had to come first. His successor, Saša Zdjelar, previously worked at ExxonMobil, Salesforce and cybersecurity firm ReversingLabs. Neither Zdjelar nor Reber responded to questions about the transition or what the security team knew; Nvidia also did not answer related questions.

The source article says nothing public links either personnel change to Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company that U.S. investigators suspect of funneling Nvidia chips to China. Megaspeed has denied wrongdoing. Nvidia’s top lawyer was involved in the government inquiry more than a year ago, The New York Times reported. The Times also reported, citing five Nvidia employees, that Huang had a relationship with a vice president who reported directly to him; Reuters later reported a second relationship, citing two people. It remains unclear whether those matters reached the security team. Relationships with subordinates are generally handled by human resources, legal departments and boards, but security specialists say ties to a company under federal scrutiny can raise separate risks.

Retired senior intelligence officer Nicholas Eftimiades, who says he has trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals, said foreign intelligence services can gather information through ordinary conversations, making potential exposure difficult to spot. He also cautioned that corporate security teams are often underfunded and narrowly focused on facilities, cyberattacks and physical threats. In a Hill opinion piece, Interfor International CEO Don Aviv and author Jeremy Hurewitz urged companies to pay more attention to insider risks, conflicts of interest and suspicious business relationships.

Eftimiades said intelligence services may seek policy insight—such as who is pressing to change export rules and who is blocking changes—rather than only technology. He cited IMSI catchers, devices that mimic cell towers, as one tool; a basic model can cost about $1,000 and fit in a suitcase, he said, while government-grade versions cost much more. He said there is no evidence presented that such devices were used against Huang. Nvidia’s board investigation and federal inquiries may clarify what the security team knew and whether it could have acted.